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For the healing of the nations, Lord, we pray with one accord,
for a just and equal sharing of the things that earth affords.
Number 367 from Hymnal: A Worship Book, text by Fred Kaan (1965)1

The surprise emergence of Thomas Piketty's Capital to national best seller
reflects increased awareness and interest surrounding income inequality in the
US.2 While evidence shows the gap between rich and poor widening during the
last 50 years, newspapers and magazines have greatly increased their coverage of
the issue since 2006.3 For instance, a search of newspaper and magazine articles
from 2002 to 2006 containing the phrase “income inequality” yielded an annual
average of 57 articles but from 2010 to 2014 yielded an annual average of 464
articles, peaking at 1,002 articles in 2014.4 The issue has also become
increasingly partisan, with commentators on the left generally advocating for
government intervention to slow down the widening gap, claiming that restricted
opportunities prevent many people from achieving financial success. Those on the
right often claim that the growing income gap stems either from differences in
work ethic or underlying market forces and thus does not require greater
government intervention, provided that sufficient opportunity exists to advance
economically.5
Within this debate, religion can influence opinions on political and
economic issues.6 Looking specifically at attitudes toward inequality, personal

1

Hymnal: A Worship Book is commonly used each Sunday across North American Mennonite
churches. Rebecca Slough, ed., Hymnal: A Worship Book (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Mennonite
Publishing House, 1992).
2
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
2014); Chris Isidore, “700-Page Book by French Economist Is Amazon's Top Seller,” CNN
Money, http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/21/news/companies/piketty-best-seller (accessed March 2,
2015).
3
For an overview of growing inequality, see “Forget the 1%: It is the 0.01% who are Really Getting
Ahead in America,”The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21631129-it-001-who-are-really-getting-ahead-america-forget-1 (accessed March 2,
2015).
4
Search conducted using Newspaper Source Plus at Eastern Mennonite University.
5
James Nuechterlein, “Living with Inequality,” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and
Public Life 212 (2011): 3.
6
Ben Gaskins, Matt Golder, and David Siegel, “Religious Participation and Economic
Conservatism,” American Journal of Political Science 57 (2013): 823.
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surveys help identify religion's impact.7 These studies provide useful insights but
only reflect survey respondents' stated preference for particular economic
conditions or outcomes. In reality, individuals' stated preferences can differ
greatly from their revealed preferences, as observed when their decisions affect a
direct monetary payoff. Consequently, surveys or “contingent valuation”
techniques often contain substantial bias compared to actual or revealed
preferences.8 Regarding religion's role, Hoffman explains how researchers often
find inconsistencies between participants' statements and actions.9
Fortunately, economic experiments can explore individuals' revealed
preferences toward income equality. A common tool for this task is the ultimatum
game (UG), where two individuals decide how to divide a monetary sum between
themselves.10 One individual, the Proposer, decides the share of the sum to keep
and the remainder goes to the partner, the Responder. While several variations are
possible (e.g., repeated versus single play, anonymity versus disclosure, etc.), the
common element is that the Responder can accept or refuse the Proposer's offer,
and in the latter case neither player receives anything. Hence, each player's
revealed preference for equality is evident from the size of the Proposer's offer
and whether or not the Responder accepts the offer. Ceteris paribus, Proposers
who favor greater economic equality should offer a larger share of the initial sum.
Responders inclined toward equality will more likely reject small offers. Critics
rightly ask whether small-scale experiments such as the UG accurately measure
true social preferences toward fairness and inequality due to the artificial
laboratory environment.11 However, because factors such as treatment effects and
anonymity can be tightly controlled, experimental findings often provide
meaningful and scalable insights into social preferences rooted in microeconomic
behavior otherwise unattainable from surveys alone.12
This study explores how religion affects revealed preferences toward
inequality during the UG and specifically examines the behaviors of Mennonites,
a Protestant denomination whose roots extend to the 16th century Anabaptist
For example, see “What You Need to Know: Public Opinion on Economic Inequality,” Public
Religion Research Institute, http://publicreligion.org/research/2013/07/public-opinion-oneconomic-inequality (accessed March 2, 2015).
8
Richard O'Doherty, “The Theory of the Contingent Valuation Method,” Hume Papers on Public
Policy 6 (1998): 67.
9
Robert Hoffmann, “The Experimental Economics of Religion,” Journal of Economic Surveys 27
(2013): 813.
10
Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze, “An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (1982): 367.
11
Steven Levitt and John List, “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences
Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (2007): 153.
12
Hoffmann, 2013.
7
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reformation in Western Europe.13 Mennonites deserve attention regarding this
contentious social issue because their doctrine emphasizes the importance of
community, mutual aid, and care for the poor. The particular sample examined
here includes students, faculty, and staff on the campus of Eastern Mennonite
University (EMU), located in Virginia, USA. The EMU campus community
features a broad range of Christian denominations, including Mennonite, and thus
allows a comparison of Mennonites with other faith traditions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly explores the relevant
literature on UG experiments and also describes Mennonites and their religious
beliefs. Section III details the particular UG experiment used in the study. Section
IV describes the results and Section V interprets the findings. Section VI provides
summary comments.
BACKGROUND
During the last 30 years researchers have used UG experiments to
investigate behaviors regarding fairness, bargaining, altruism, and related topics.
Camerer and van Damme et al. thoroughly review this literature and summarize
key findings.14 Typical (i.e., median and mode) Proposer offers range from 40 to
50 percent of the initial sum. Mean offers are generally 30 to 40 percent of the
initial sum, with very few Proposers offering less than 10 percent or more than 50
percent. Responders nearly always accept offers of at least 40 percent but reject
offers below 20 percent about half the time. These behaviors for both Proposers
and Responders discredit the usual assumptions of Neo-Classical economics,
where each individual presumably maximizes their self-interest. Stated
differently, some Responders willingly reject “free money” and some Proposers
offer more than the minimum required to entice Responders' acceptance. The
Proposer offers defy easy explanation, however, since relatively large offers may
reflect either preferences for greater equality or strategic self-interest since larger
offers raise the Responders' likelihood of acceptance.15
The question whether religion influences UG actions thus lies within the
general literature regarding religion's impact on prosocial and “helping”
Palmer Becker, “What is an Anabaptist Christian?”
http://www.mennonitemission.net/SiteCollectionDocuments/Tools%20for%20Mission/Missio%2
0Dei/DL.MissioDei18.E.pdf (accessed March 5, 2015).
14
Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003); Eric van Damme et al., “How Werner Güth's Ultimatum
Game Shaped Our Understanding of Social Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 108 (2014): 292.
15
Camerer, 2003; Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 2 (1988): 195.
13
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behaviors. Norenzayan and Shariff identify four possible reasons why religion
promotes prosocial behavior, based on: 1) Social reputation, 2) “Supernatural
monitoring,” 3) Increased trust among group members, 4) Group size, where
larger groups tend to display greater religiosity.16 The first argument extends even
to Adam Smith who said that human capital investment includes an individual's
reputation, of which religious participation helps to reinforce.17 Reason number
two states that so-called supernatural monitoring can replace formal monitoring
mechanisms whose social function is to support commerce and trade. For
example, experimental evidence suggests a positive impact of religious language
and imagery on altruistic behavior.18 Argument three occurs where a common
religion between strangers provides reasons to extend trust more than would
prevail without religion. Proponents claim that such trust evolves from costly
prosocial and cooperative behaviors.19 Lastly, religion provides a deterrent against
freeloading (i.e., antisocial behavior) in large groups.20
From a psychological perspective, religion's impact on individual altruism
stems from whether their religiosity shows an intrinsic or extrinsic orientation.21
Extrinsic religiosity reflects self-interest and views religion as a “means to an
end,” and with the exception of reputation promotion, shows little connection to
helping behaviors. Intrinsic religion reflects not the means but the end itself and
should positively influence helping behaviors. Overall, however, psychologists
find scant evidence for any religious impact on altruistic behavior. The limited
positive connections are generally based on stated attitudes and preferences only.
More specifically, a recent literature within economics explores whether
religion and culture influence UG outcomes.22 Tan measured UG participants'
self-reported general religiosity and found no significant impacts on the behavior
of either Proposers or Responders among a Judeo-Christian population in
Ara Norenzayan and Azim Shariff, “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Prosociality,” Science
322 (2008): 58.
17
Gary Anderson, “Mr. Smith and the Preachers: The Economics of Religion in the Wealth of
Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988): 1066.
18
Azim Shariff and Ara Norenzayan, “God is Watching You: Priming God Concepts Increases
Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game,” Psychological Science 18 (2007): 803.
19
Richard Sosis and Candace Alcorta, “Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred: The Evolution of
Religious Behavior,” Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 12 (2003): 264.
20
John Snarey, “The Natural Environment's Impact upon Religious Ethics: A Cross-Cultural
Study,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35 (1996): 85.
21
Bernard Spilka et al., The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach (New York: The
Guilford Press, 2003); Gordon Allport, “Religion and Prejudice,” The Crane Review 2 (1959): 1.
22
Hoffmann, 2013; Hessel Oosterbeek, Randolph Sloof, and Gijs van de Kuilen, “Cultural
Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis,” Experimental
Economics 7 (2004): 171.
16
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Germany.23 He did, however, find impacts on Responder behavior due to specific
religious factors such as degree of ritual practice and spiritual encounter. Chuah et
al. found that greater religiosity for British and Chinese-Malayan Proposers
produced lower offers.24 Buchan et al. claimed that Japanese Proposers provide
higher offers than their American counterparts.25 On the other hand, Roth et al.
found that offers from Americans and Yugoslavians generally exceed offers from
Japanese and Israeli Proposers.26 They also found lower rejection rates in Japan
and Israel than in the US and Yugoslavia. Henrich conducted UG experiments in
both a traditional Amazonian-Peruvian society and the US and found that the
Peruvian offers are more than 20 percentage points below the American offers.27
The Peruvian Responders accepted nearly all these offers. Finally, Chuah et al.
found that Chinese-Malaysian Proposers generally offer more than British
nationals but the authors did not find significant behavioral differences among
Responders.28 One interpretation for these contradictory results is that differing
geography alone does not imply cultural values. Moreover, within-country results
can show considerable variation.29 Nonetheless, the above studies suggest that
external factors such as religion and culture can affect social preferences as
observed in UG outcomes. In addition, UG evidence from disparate communities
such as Amazonian, Japanese, and Israeli shows a direct relationship to the offer
amount and the rejection rate, thereby suggesting possible Proposer foresight
regarding Responder behavior.
This study extends the above literature by asking whether UG behaviors
for one particular Christian denomination that emphasizes social justice teachings
in its doctrine differ from mainline denominations. On one hand, predicting
Mennonite behavior in the UG versus other denominations is challenging since
Mennonites and other Anabaptist groups trace their history to Western Europe
Jonathan Tan, “Religion and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study,” Economics Letters 90
(2006): 60.
24
Swee-Hoon Chuah et al., “An Economic Anatomy of Culture: Attitudes and Behaviour in Interand Intra-National Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Journal of Economic Psychology 30 (2009):
732.
25
Nancy Buchan, Rachel Croson, and Eric Johnson, “When Do Fair Beliefs Influence Bargaining
Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and the United States,” Journal of Consumer
Research 31 (2004): 181.
26
Alvin Roth et al., “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and
Tokyo: An Experimental Study,” The American Economic Review 81 (1991): 1068.
27
Joseph Henrich, “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining
Among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon,” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 973.
28
Swee-Hoon Chuah et al., “Do Cultures Clash? Evidence from Cross-National Ultimatum Game
Experiments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 64 (2007): 35.
29
Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen, 2004.
23
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around 1520 and share a common history with mainline Protestants.30
Consequently, modern Mennonites have certainly been exposed to Calvinist
influences, where individual financial success signifies God's blessing. 31 Another
contributing factor could be that most modern Mennonites no longer distinguish
themselves from secular society in terms of dress, language, or other rituals as
common 50 to 100 years ago.32 Hence, there is a potential growing influence on
Mennonites of the larger American society, which shows a moderate tolerance for
widening inequality.33
On the other hand, Mennonite doctrinal emphasis on social justice issues
remains strong. The 1995 Mennonite Confession of Faith claims the authority of
Jesus' teachings such as the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew chapters 5 to 7) and
the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:29-37) that mandate care for the
physical needs of others.34 Moreover, two highly influential Mennonite writers,
Ronald Sider and Donald Kraybill, argue that Christian discipleship includes a
social - and even political - component regarding poverty alleviation and concern
for human material well-being.35 Thus, if Anabaptist-Mennonite values produce
greater social preference toward justice and fairness, Mennonite Proposers should
ceteris paribus show higher offer values and Mennonite Responders show higher
rejection rates for low offers than non-Mennonites.
DATA AND METHODS
The specific UG employed in this study was a single play, non-negotiable
game with full anonymity for both participants and an initial $10 sum provided to
the Proposer. Potential participants age 18 and older were recruited from the
EMU campus community, including undergraduate and graduate students, faculty
and staff, and family and friends of these groups. However, no EMU connection
was required to participate. Recruitment took place using classroom visits,
Becker, “What is an Anabaptist Christian?”; “Who are the Mennonites?” Third Way Media,
http://www.thirdway.com/menno/?Topic=23|Basic+Beliefs (accessed March 5, 2015).
31
James Smith and Jon Wisman, “Legitimating Inequality: Fooling Most of the People All of the
Time,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 70 (2011): 974.
32
“Who are the Mennonites?” Third Way Media.
33
“What You Need to Know: Public Opinion on Economic Inequality,” Public Religion Research
Institute.
34
“Confession of Faith in a Mennonite Perspective,” Mennonite Church USA,
http://resources.mennoniteusa.org/about/confession-of-faith-in-a-mennonite-perspective-1995
(accessed March 5, 2015).
35
Ronald Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: Moving from Affluence to Generosity (Dallas:
Word Publishing, 1997); Donald Kraybill, The Upside-Down Kingdom (Harrisonburg, VA: Herald
Press, 2011).
30

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jrbe/vol3/iss2/2

6

Gingrich et al.: Religion and Fairness in the Ultimatum Game

campus electronic classifieds, Facebook, posters, and personal invitation.
Participants received no compensation, other than the promise of “winning” up to
$10. In September 2013 EMU's Institutional Review Board approved the study's
use of human subjects.
Before participating in the experiment, candidates received full disclosure
regarding the game and their rights. After agreeing to these conditions,
participants completed a brief survey regarding their religious preference and
commitment, age, sex, and status in the EMU community (faculty, student, etc.).
The Appendix contains the full consent agreement and survey. The consent
agreement, survey, and UG sessions all occurred in a computer laboratory, with
each session consisting of 10 to 24 participants (mean = 15.2). Total available
funding provided for 116 UG pairs.
The ultimatum game sessions were managed using a cloud-based game
service provided by MobLab, Inc.36 Lab assistants fully explained the game
procedures to the participants after they completed the consent form and initial
survey. Once the game began, MobLab randomly divided the group into
Proposers and Responders and also randomly paired a Proposer and Responder. In
scenarios with an odd number of participants MobLab left one Proposer without a
Responder, unknown to this individual. In such cases (N = 5), MobLab
automatically rejected their offers. The Proposer and Responder had two minutes
to complete their agreement. On only 3 occasions was the allotted time
inadequate, in which case only the Proposer offers appear in the subsequent
analysis. Participants who “earned” a positive payout received their cash
immediately after the game concluded.
RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of all participants and also
describes Proposer and Responder behavior for each demographic subset. Out of
116 Proposers the largest single religious group was Mennonite (N = 42),
followed by other Christian (N = 22), Protestant Christian (N = 18), Catholic (N =
18), Anabaptist non-Mennonite (N = 7),37 Atheist/Agnostic (N = 7), and one each
for Buddhist, Hindu, Quaker, and other. The Proposers' average age was 30.1
“Moblab: A playground for decisions,” Moblab, Inc., https://www.moblab.com (accessed
December 7, 2015).
37
Includes non-Mennonite denominations with a shared history and doctrinal beliefs (e.g.,
Brethren). For more information see Becker, “What is an Anabaptist Christian?” and “How
Brethren Understand God's Word,” The Brethren Church, Inc.,
http://www.brethrenchurch.org/upload/documents/Brethren_Documents_and_Resources/How_Br
ethren_Understand_Gods_Word.pdf (accessed March 5, 2015).
36
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years and 61.2 percent were female. For all religions combined, Proposers'
average level of religious commitment was 3.12 (Likert scale from 1 to 4, with a
score of 1 reflecting weaker religious commitment and 4 reflecting stronger
commitment), with Mennonites and Anabaptist non-Mennonites showing the
strongest commitment at 3.36 and 3.71, respectively. The vast majority of
Proposers were students (undergraduate = 78.4 percent and graduate = 3.4
percent), followed by faculty (8.6 percent), staff (7.8 percent), and all others
combined (1.8 percent). Responders (N = 108) show a similar pattern at 56.8
percent female with an average age of 29.4 years. Mennonites were also the
largest group (N = 33) with Protestants (N = 22), other Christians (N = 17),
Catholics (N = 18), Anabaptist non-Mennonite (N = 7), Atheist/Agnostic (N = 6),
and Buddhist (N = 1) finishing out the groups. Religious commitment varied less
for Responders, ranging from a 3.11 average for Catholics to a 3.39 average for
Mennonites, and an overall mean of 3.24. Over 83 percent of Responders were
EMU students, with faculty comprising 9.3 percent, staff 6.6 percent and the
remainder (0.9 percent) representing other categories.
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Table 1. Summary of Ultimatum Game results, by religious subgroup.
All

Proposers
N (number)
Religious
commitment (1
to 4)
Age (years) +
percent Female
percent
Undergraduate
percent Faculty
percent
Graduate
Student
percent No
relationship
percent Staff
Member
percent None of
the above
Average Decision
($)
Median Decision
($)
Mode decision ($)
Standard
Deviation ($)

Mennonite

Protestant

Atheist or
Agnostic

Other*

116
3.12

42
3.36

18
3.22

22
2.82

16
2.69

7
2.71

4
3.25

30.7
61.2
78.5

27.9
54.8
71.4

36.4
72.2
83.3

31.8
72.7
86.4

28.2
68.8
81.3

34.3
42.9
71.4

31.7
28.6
71.4

26.8
75.0
100.0

8.6
3.5

11.9
0.00

11.1
0.0

4.6
9.1

12.5
6.3

0.0
0.0

0.0
14.3

0.0
0.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

14.3

0.0

0.30

7.8

14.3

5.6

0.0

0.0

14.3

14.3

0.0

0.9

2.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.61

4.76

4.44

4.59

4.50

4.43

4.57

4.75

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00
1.75

5.00
1.62

5.00
1.42

5.00
2.32

5.00
1.15

5.00
1.62

5.00
3.10

5.00
0.50

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2015
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Other

Catholic

Anabaptist
nonMennonite
7
3.71
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Table 1 (continued)
All

Responder
N (number)
Religious
commitment (1
to 4)
Age (years) +
percent Female
percent
Undergraduate
percent Faculty
percent Graduate
student
percent No
relationship
percent Staff
member
percent None of
the above
Rejection Rate
(percent)

Mennonite

Protestant

Christian/
Other

Catholic

Anabaptist
nonMennonite

Atheist or
Agnostic

Other*

108
3.24

33
3.39

22
3.14

17
3.24

18
3.11

7
3.14

6
3.17

29.3
57.4
82.4

30.6
51.5
66.7

26.4
59.1
90.9

30.9
82.4
94.1

29.2
33.3
94.4

35.4
57.1
57.1

25.3
16.7
83.3

21.0
100.0
100.0

9.3
0.9

18.2
3.0

4.6
0.0

0.0
0.0

5.6
0.0

28.6
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

5.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6.6

12.1

4.6

0.0

0.0

14.3

16.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

8.3

6.1

14.3

11.8

5.6

14.3

0.0

0.0

1
3.00

*Includes Buddhist, Hindu, Quaker and self-described “other.”
+Given the high percent of undergraduate students, the average age is greater than expected due to several UG sessions
conducted during evening adult degree completion classes.
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Figure 1. Probability distribution of Proposer offers (N = 116).
1.00
0.90

Probability

0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
$0

$1

$2

$3

$4

$5

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10

Proposer Offers

Proposer offers averaged $4.61 with both a median and mode of $5.
Figure 1 shows the probability distribution for all offers. While Mennonites
demonstrate the highest mean offer ($4.76), Table 2 shows that it does not differ
statistically from any other religious subgroup. One related question is whether
the degree of religious commitment might affect the mean offers. Hence, Table 3
compares offers for strongly committed Mennonites, as measured by a selfreported commitment of 3 or above, to the mean offers of other religious groups
with an identical commitment and also to less committed individuals
(commitment of 2 or less). Even after adding this distinction, none of the mean
offers for other subgroups differ from the mean Mennonite offers.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2015

11

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 3 [2015], Art. 2

Table 2. P-values from test of equal means for Proposer offer values, by subgroup
(sample size). Null hypothesis is that mean values are equal.

Mennonites
(42)

Atheists
and
Agnostics
(7)
0.879

Anabaptists
nonMennonite
(7)
0.627

Catholic
(16)

Christian
Protestant
(18)

0.497

0.453

Christian
other
(22)

All nonMennonites
(74)

0.760

0.475

Note: Not all subcategories are tested because of small sample sizes.

Table 3. P-values from test of equal means for Proposer offer values, by subgroup
according to either strong or weak religious commitment (sample size). Strong
commitment denotes a self-report religious commitment of 3 or 4 (Likert scale =
1 to 4) and weak commitment denotes 1 or 2. Null hypothesis is that mean values
are equal.

Mennonites,
strong
commitment
(37)

Anabaptists
nonMennonite,
strong
commitment
(6)
0.511

Catholic,
strong
commitment
(11)

0.396

Christian
Protestant,
strong
commitment
(14)
0.387

Christian
other, strong
commitment
(14)

All groups
combined,
weak
commitment
(27)

0.933

0.460

Note: Not all subcategories are tested because of small sample sizes.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of Responders' acceptance probabilities,
conditional on their offers received. Overall, the Responders accepted Proposers'
offers at a very high rate (91.7 percent). They accepted all offers $4 and above
and accepted offers between $1 and $3 at a 60 percent rate. Responders rejected
all 3 zero offers. For the entire sample, Responders rejected only 6 offers which
did not provide sufficient observations to meaningfully analyze religion's impact
on their behavior.
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Figure 2. Probability distribution of Responder acceptance rate, conditional on
offer received.
1.00
0.90
0.80

Probability of Acceptance

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
$0 (3) $1 (1) $2 (5) $3 (9) $4 (8) $5 (74) $6 (2) $7 (0) $8 (1) $9 (0) $10 (5)

Proposer Offers (number of offers)

Note: MobLab restricted offers to discrete dollar amounts (e.g., $2.00, $3.00,
etc.).
A shortcoming in comparing Proposer offers in Tables 2 and 3 is that the
tests only account for potential differences arising from religious factors.
Alternatively, a regression model can jointly explore all factors affecting Proposer
offers, including religion, sex, age, and status (e.g., student vs. faculty). Following
Chuah et al., Proposer offers are regressed on all available demographic variables
including possible interaction effects.38 Full descriptions and summary statistics
for all variables appear in Table 4. Given the small sample size (N = 7), their
shared historical roots and doctrine, plus the lack of significant differences in
38

Chuah et al., 2009.
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Tables 2 and 3, Anabaptist non-Mennonites were pooled with Mennonites.
Likewise, faculty and staff were also combined due to small sample sizes (N = 10
and N = 9, respectively).
Table 4. Summary of variables used in regression model to predict Proposers'
offer values (N=116).
Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

Description
Proposer offer values ($), ranging from 0 to
10
Binary variable = 1 if Proposer is either
Mennonite or Anabaptist non-Mennonite,
otherwise = 0
Binary variable = 1 if Proposer is female,
otherwise =0

OFFER

4.61

1.75

ANABAPTISTMENNO

0.42

..

FEMALE

0.61

..

30.67

13.52

0.16

..

Proposer's age (years)
Binary variable =1 if Proposer is either
EMU faculty or staff,
otherwise = 0

12.17

..

ANABAPTIST-MENNO * AGE

0.22

..

ANABAPTIST-MENNO * FEMALE

0.04

..

ANABAPTIST-MENNO * FACSTAFF

AGE

FACSTAFF
A-MENNO*AGE
A-MENNO*FEMALE
AMENNO*FACSTAFF
FEMALE*AGE

20.55

..

FEMALE * AGE

FACSTAFF*AGE

4.02

..

FACSTAFF * AGE

FEMALE*FACSTAFF

0.03

..

FEMALE * FACSTAFF

Table 5 contains the regression results for the Proposer offers. The most
glaring finding is the lack of significance for Anabaptist-Mennonite (AM)
identity. To explore all possible AM influences, two alternative specifications
were also investigated. First, Mennonite Proposers were decoupled from
Anabaptist non-Mennonite Proposers. Second, different levels for religious
commitment (1 to 4) were used to identify Mennonite Proposers. In summary,
these alternate configurations did not change the statistical significance of
Mennonite identity and generally produced lower R2 values.39

39

Results available on request
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Table 5. Regression results for Proposers' offer values (N = 116). Dependent
variable = OFFER
Full Estimate

Reduced Estimate

Variable

Coefficient

Std.
Error

pvalue

Intercept

2.10

0.98

0.034

-0.85

0.92

0.355

3.09

1.23

AGE

0.12

FACSTAFF
A-MENNO*AGE

Coefficient

Std.
Error

pvalue

2.54

0.75

0.000

0.013

2.45

0.94

0.011

0.04

0.002

0.10

0.03

0.002

0.18

2.03

0.930

-2.19

0.95

0.024

0.05

0.04

0.199

A-MENNO*FEMALE

-0.02

0.75

0.974

A-MENNO*
FACSTAFF
FEMALE*AGE

-1.63

1.24

0.190

-0.15

0.04

0.001

-0.12

0.04

0.002

FACSTAFF*AGE

-0.06

0.05

0.244

3.76

1.44

0.010

2.94

1.17

0.013

ANABAPTISTMENNO
FEMALE

FEMALE*
FACSTAFF
F statistic (degrees of

1.47 (10,105)

0.161

2.35 (5,110)

0.045

freedom)

R2

0.123

0.097

Other variables that significantly affect Proposer offers include sex, age,
and the Proposer's relationship to EMU (i.e., faculty-staff status). Age shows a
mixed impact on offers depending on the Proposer's sex. For men, each year
generally adds $0.10 to their offers, while women reduce their offers by $0.02 for
each additional year. Similarly, female proposers generally show smaller offers
than males (a $0.68 reduction at the data means), and this effect becomes more
pronounced with age but is less pronounced for EMU faculty-staff. The marginal
impact of a Proposer's faculty-staff status yields a mixed impact by sex, with male
faculty-staff offering substantially less ($2.19) than males from other groups,
while female faculty-staff offer slightly more ($0.75) than other females.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2015

15

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 3 [2015], Art. 2

DISCUSSION
The above result - that Mennonite Proposers, including all Anabaptists, do
not show any significant differences for their offers compared to other Christian
groups – at first appears inconsistent with Mennonite doctrinal positions that
emphasize community and concern for human need. While this finding does not
negate these positions, it implies that Mennonite social preferences toward
inequality are no different than other mainline American Christians. As described
earlier, this result could occur from factors such as the historical influences of
Calvinism or Mennonite assimilation with the dominant Christian culture. Yet
another factor could be the lack of specific religious questioning which would
match Tan's findings.40
An alternative interpretation for the above finding is that individuals from
other denominations have recently become equally concerned about inequality as
Mennonites so that no unique denominational behaviors appear in the results.
Increased coverage regarding inequality in the national media could partly explain
this phenomenon. This “convergence” of Mennonite and non-Mennonite beliefs
and practices is especially likely for the EMU sample given that the university's
mission and vision statements emphasize Mennonite ideals regarding community.
EMU's vision statement quotes Micah 6:8:
we commit ourselves to “do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with God.”
[quotes added] 41

In addition, EMU's Shared Values state that:
EMU embodies the enduring values of the Anabaptist tradition: Christian
discipleship, community, service, and peacebuilding. [italics added] 42

These claims are potentially evident on campus through a Center for
Justice and Peacebuilding that includes a graduate degree program and several
offshoots that aim to address global injustice issues and other sources of conflict
and violence.43 In addition, for over 30 years EMU undergraduates have been
required to participate in a cross-cultural seminar experience for their general
education coursework. For the vast majority of students, this seminar occurs in
40

Tan, 2006.
“EMU Mission Statement,” Eastern Mennonite University, http://emu.edu/president/mission
(accessed December 7, 2015).
42
Ibid.
43
“The Center for Justice and Peacebuilding,” Eastern Mennonite University, http://emu.edu/cjp
(accessed December 7, 2015).
41
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either a low income country or relatively poor location within the US. While
direct student outcomes from this experience are difficult to generalize, a stated
purpose of the program since its inception has been to internationalize and
provide credibility for EMU's goal of “working toward world peace, just social
structures, and equality of access to the basic necessities for life and dignity.”44
The above information begs the question of how EMU Proposers' mean
offer compares to other settings. Recall from Table 1 that the mean offer for all
EMU participants was $4.61 or 46 percent of the initial sum. By contrast,
Camerer claims that broad evidence from the literature shows mean offers ranging
from 30 to 40 percent of the initial sum.45 While it is tempting to attribute this
difference to the EMU-specific influences described above, the lack of empirical
test regarding this claim makes it tenuous at best. Moreover, Camerer's sources
reveal substantial variation in sample sizes, ranging from only 10 UG pairs to 330
pairs.46 Taking a weighted average of all studies listed with the weights based on
sample sizes reveals an overall mean of 39.3 percent. The two most comparable
studies that also conducted the UG on an American college campus show mean
offers ranging from 39 to 41 percent and 44 to 47 percent, which closely resemble
the EMU mean.47 Moreover, Oosterbeek et al.'s broad finding that cultural factors
do not significantly affect UG offers places a high burden of proof to attribute the
higher EMU offers to Mennonite-related factors.48 The EMU offers also showed
an overall standard deviation of $1.75 ($1.62 for Mennonites), which lies slightly
above the standard deviation from the two studies cited above (ranging from
$1.03 to $1.33).49 If anything, the EMU offers should show less variability if the
university's mission and vision statement influenced UG behaviors across
campus.
Yet another potentially important information piece would be the length of
time that participants had spent at EMU. These data would allow a test whether
time exposed to Mennonite beliefs and values raised Proposer offers among nonMennonites. Unfortunately, these data were not gathered in the initial survey.
Bruce Martin, “The Impact of the Cross-Cultural on the Changing Religious Identity of Early
Adults: A Thematic Approach” (D.Min. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 2001); Orval
Gingerich, “Internationalizing General Education: A Case Study of Eastern Mennonite College
and the Global Village Curriculum,” (Ed.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1995), 137.
45
Camerer, 2003.
46
Roth et al., 1991; Robert Slonim and Alvin Roth, “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games:
An Experiment in the Slovak Republic,” Econometrica 66 (1998): 569.
47
Catherine Eckel and Philip Grossman, “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games,” Economic
Inquiry 39 (2001): 171; Robert Forsythe, “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Games
and Economic Behavior 6 (1994): 347.
48
Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen, 2004.
49
Rescaled to match the $10 initial sum listed here. Details available upon request.
44
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Even if the EMU offers exceeded those from other settings, it is
impossible to know whether higher offers reflect Proposer perceptions that
Responders may not accept “unfair” splits. If this belief exists, the higher offers
would not reflect Mennonite ideals of community and altruism but would reflect
Proposer self-interest. However, the tendency for the EMU Responders to accept
nearly all nonzero offers (Fig. 2) suggests that the Proposers offered more than the
minimum amount to convince Responders to accept. If Proposers acted selfishly
and foresaw that most Responders would likely accept a $2 or $3 offer, the results
would show more “low” offers. That is, the $4 and $5 offers could be considered
altruistic if Proposers foresaw Responder preferences. While this possibility
cannot be confirmed, other studies suggest that Proposers use foresight to increase
or decrease their offers to match Responder behavior.50 Another way to identify
altruistic motives for the Proposers would be to ask their perceptions about the
minimum offer that Responders would accept. This answer could then be
compared to their actual offer.
A related area for future study would be to conduct the Dictator Game
(DG) on the EMU campus and examine any distinct Mennonite behaviors. In the
DG experiment, two players also divide a sum among themselves, except that
there is no Responder decision. Rather, the “Dictator” decides how to divide the
sum and any positive amounts given to their partner reflects pure altruism.51
Future researchers should also compare the EMU UG results to similar
data obtained from non-Mennonite institutions, such as a Mainline Protestant
campus. This would help identify aspects of the results that stem from a
convergence between Mennonites and Mainline Protestants and aspects that arise
from EMU's campus ethos.
CONCLUSION
This study examined religion's impact on social preferences by examining
behaviors in the ultimatum game (UG) for one group of American Christians,
Anabaptist Mennonites. Mennonites deserve special attention in this area due to
their doctrinal emphasis on social justice issues. The results showed that
Mennonite Proposers' mean offer did not significantly differ from other
Christians. Proposers' mean offer for the entire sample on the campus of Eastern
Mennonite University was 46 percent of the initial sum, which is near to but
slightly higher than most existing studies. By contrast, Responders were slightly
50
51

Henrich, 2000; Roth et al., 1991.
Camerer. 2003.
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more accepting of Proposer offers than documented elsewhere, though
insufficient data prevented a separate analysis of this result for Mennonites. To
the extent that Proposers foresaw Responders' low rejection rates, the higher
offers suggest overall greater altruism for EMU Proposers than for other settings.
One contributing factor to this result may be EMU's vision and mission
statements that emphasize community and social justice perspectives.
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APPENDIX – CONSENT AND SURVEY FORMS
*required
Please read the following consent form and type your full name, today's date, and your email address if you agree to
participate.
If you participate in this research, you will be asked to reveal your own religious affiliation or preference and then
participate in a short exercise where you will correspond anonymously via computer with another person regarding a
potential cash payoff. During the exercise you can earn up to $10 or you may earn nothing. The earnings from the
exercise will be paid immediately upon completion. You may only participate in the exercise one time. There are
no foreseeable risks or discomforts to you as the subject.
Except for the above potential earnings (minimum = $0, maximum = $10), there will be no personal benefits to you
from participating in this research. Your participation in the experiment will take approximately 5 to 10 minutes.
Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. You may refuse to participate at all, or choose to stop your
participation at any point in the research without fear of penalty or negative consequence.
This personal information/data you provide for this research will be treated confidentially, and all raw data will be
kept in a secured file by the researcher. Results of the research will be reported as aggregate summary data only,
and no individually identifiable information will be presented unless explicit permission is given to do so.
You also have the right to review the results of the research, if you wish to do so. A copy of the results may be
obtained by contacting the researcher.
Dr. Chris Gingrich
Eastern Mennonite University
Harrisonburg, VA 22802
540-432-4154
chris.gingrich@emu.edu
Participant consent
I, (type full name below) ________________________ have read and understood the foregoing information
explaining the purpose of this research and my rights and responsibilities as a subject. Typing my name, today's
date, and my email address below designates my consent to participate in this research, according to the terms and
conditions listed above.
Please type your full name*
______________________________
Please enter today’s date*
______________________________
Please enter your email address*
______________________________
Your email will not be shared with anyone
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Please answer the following questions. All information will be treated confidentially.
With what religion/denomination do you must closely align your own beliefs? (check only one)*













Atheist or Agnostic
Buddhist
Christian/catholic
Christian/Anabaptist non-Mennonite (e.g. Brethren)
Christian/Mennonite
Christian/Protestant (e.g. Baptist, Lutheran)
Christian/Other
Hinduism
Islam
Judaism
Mormon
Other _______________

Regarding the above religious affiliation, how would you describe your commitment to these beliefs?
1
weakly committed 

2

3 4

   strongly committed

Please enter your age (years)*
______________________________
Please provide your sex*
 Female
 Male
Please mark your relationship to EMU (choose only one)*







Undergraduate student
Graduate or seminary student
Faculty member
Staff member
No relationship to EMU
None of the above
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